Trade Restrictiveness Indices in the Presence of Externalities: An Application to Non-Tariff Measures by Beghin, John Christopher et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications: Agricultural Economics Agricultural Economics Department
2015
Trade Restrictiveness Indices in the Presence of
Externalities: An Application to Non-Tariff
Measures
John Christopher Beghin
Anne-Célia Disdier
Stéphan Marette
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ageconfacpub
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications: Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
IOWA	  STATE	  UNIVERSITY	  
Department	  of	  Economics	  
Ames,	  Iowa,	  50011-­‐1070	  
 
Iowa	  State	  University	  does	  not	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  race,	  color,	  age,	  religion,	  national	  origin,	  sexual	  orientation,	  
gender	  identity,	  genetic	  information,	  sex,	  marital	  status,	  disability,	  or	  status	  as	  a	  U.S.	  veteran.	  Inquiries	  can	  be	  directed	  
to	  the	  Director	  of	  Equal	  Opportunity	  and	  Compliance,	  3280	  Beardshear	  Hall,	  (515)	  294-­‐7612.	  
 
Trade Restrictiveness Indices in Presence of
Externalities: An Application to Non-Tariff Measures
 John C. Beghin,  Anne-Celia Disdier,  Stephan Marette
Working Paper No. 12023
October 2012
Revised on July 2013
0 
 
Trade Restrictiveness Indices in Presence of Externalities:  
An Application to Non-Tariff Measures 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We extend the trade restrictiveness index approach to the case of market imperfections 
and domestic regulations addressing them. We focus on standard-like non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) affecting cost of production and potentially enhancing demand by reducing negative 
externalities. We apply the framework to the database of Kee et al. (2009) and derive ad valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) for technical measures. About 39% of the product lines affected by NTMs 
exhibit negative AVEs, indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of these measures. Accounting 
for these effects significantly reduces previous measures of countries’ trade policy restrictiveness 
obtained while constraining these NTMs to be trade reducing.  
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1. Introduction 
Standard-like non-tariff measures (NTMs) are playing an increasing role in international trade. 
Some of them have protectionist purposes, especially in a context of decreasing tariff barriers. 
However, some others are adopted by policymakers to address market imperfections 
(externalities, information asymmetries). In such cases, NTMs may be trade facilitating and 
welfare enhancing. The literature measuring the restrictiveness of the trade policy, through the 
computation of various indices, has failed to consider these effects. Our paper fills this gap. 
With global sourcing, it becomes challenging to guarantee products’ safety and quality 
and to mitigate negative externalities. Standards and regulations affecting quality help overcome 
asymmetric information issues. Occasional recalls by toy, pharmaceutical and food companies 
illustrate the importance of various safety concerns, such as led paints in children toys (Lipton 
and Barboza, 2007). Consumers may also care about global commons and avoid purchasing 
products obtained using unsustainable environmental practices. To preserve their reputation, 
large firms (e.g. Home Depot, IKEA, etc.) have shown strong support for forest certification 
(McDermott and Cashore, 2009). Similarly, consumer welfare is improved by quality 
requirements limiting residues of dangerous pesticides and antibiotics in food products (Disdier 
and Marette, 2010). 
In this context, regulatory interventions have strong economic and political support, 
despite risks of inefficiency and distortions. The effects of these regulatory instruments are 
indeed complex not only because instruments vary across countries and are imperfect but also 
because they impact costs of heterogeneous producers (Carrère and de Melo, 2011). Meeting the 
NTMs is costly for both domestic and foreign suppliers and often more so for the latter. In the 
context of North-South trade, these impacts have been contentious as they may hinder or 
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enhance trade depending on the net effect of these standards (Jaffee and Henson, 2005). While a 
regulation may thwart a market failure and facilitate trade between countries, it may also reduce 
market access for foreign producers who cannot easily comply with this regulation. To illustrate, 
between October 2006 and 2007, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
announced 473 products recalls of which 389 cases involved imported products (CPSC, 2008). 
This last effect may outweigh the “legitimate action” to mitigate a market failure. Both trade and 
welfare impacts of regulation are ambiguous and in general hard to evaluate. A rigorous 
empirical measure of these impacts therefore requires a consistent framework, as proposed here.  
We consider a small open economy, distorted, first, by arbitrary tariffs and other 
domestic price policy distortions, and second by market imperfections and existing NTMs 
allegedly addressing them. We pay particular attention to NTMs and their protective effects 
against import competing products, as well as their potential demand enhancing effects when 
NTMs reduce information asymmetries and trade cost. We then extend the trade restrictiveness 
index (TRI) approach of Anderson and Neary (2005) to this more general and realistic case 
encompassing market failures and the existing domestic regulations addressing them.  
The TRI approach of Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994, 1996, 2003, and 2005) provides a 
welfare-based consistent aggregation of various trade distortions into a scalar uniform surtax 
factor, equivalent to these distortions in terms of their welfare effects. The TRI approach is a 
concept applying to a whole economy because it relies on the balance of trade approach. 
Nevertheless, it has been applied successfully to partial equilibrium and multi-market situations 
for both developed and developing economies. Feenstra (1995) has proposed some simplifying 
assumptions greatly fostering the applicability of the approach by reducing the number of price 
responses to estimate or calibrate in the implementation. The TRI and its extensions such as the 
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Mercantilist TRI (MTRI) of Anderson and Neary (2003) have been used to derive the tariff 
equivalent of arbitrary tariff structures (Anderson and Neary, 1994), tariffs and quotas (Anderson 
and Neary, 1992 and 2005), tariffs and domestic production subsidies (Anderson et al., 1995; 
Anderson and Neary, 2005; Beghin et al., 2003), and tariffs and AVEs of other NTMs (Hoekman 
and Nicita, 2011; Kee et al., 2009; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2008; and Bratt, 2012), among others. 
As shown in these applications, the TRI approach provides a consistent aggregation of 
distortionary effects of various policy instruments into a single “total” AVE within a given 
sector. The latter property explains the recent success and popularity of the approach in empirical 
investigations of NTMs in presence of tariffs and other price policies at the sector level.  
The novelty of the present paper is to allow for market imperfections and trade 
facilitating effects of NTMs in the TRI framework. Despite its inherent ability to capture second-
best situations, the determination of the TRI under market failure has been overlooked in the 
trade literature. The only related effort in this direction is from Chau et al. (2007) who develop a 
quantity-based distance function, a trade restrictiveness quantity index, in presence of 
environmental externalities but abstracting from existing policy interventions. Outside of the TRI 
literature, recent empirical investigations note that NTM regimes can facilitate trade (see Cadot 
and Gourdon, 2012, for a review). Reputation and certification processes increase trust in 
exchange (Blind et al., 2013); quality standards help reputation and reputation loss can be 
detrimental to trade (Jouanjean, 2012); and transparency provisions in trade agreements can 
facilitate regulated trade flows (Lejárraga et al., 2013). 
We fill this gap in the TRI-related trade literature: we consider the TRI of arbitrary 
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tariffs, domestic production subsidies, and NTMs in presence of possible external effects.1 This 
undertaking is a substantive step forward for two reasons. First, trade policy reforms often occur 
in the context of market imperfections such as asymmetric information or negative externalities 
imposed on some agents. Accounting for these imperfections is relevant and has been the central 
pillar of the trade and environment literature using the dual approach to trade (Copeland, 1994; 
and Beghin et al., 1997). Surprisingly, this case has eluded the TRI literature. Second, numerous 
NTMs have been emerging in the last 15 years for several reasons, including potential 
protectionism, but also to address consumer and retailer concerns for health and the environment 
and associated external effects. A priori, excluding potential market imperfections when 
analyzing NTM policy reforms biases results and could lead to erroneous policy 
recommendations. Not surprisingly, sectoral AVEs and TRI estimates are likely to exhibit 
upward bias when they are econometrically constrained to treat all policies as trade-reducing. We 
depart from this restrictive premise and start from an agnostic prior on the impact of NTM 
policies on trade and welfare. 
We then apply the proposed framework to the NTM global database of Kee et al. (2009) 
consisting of a large cross section of products (at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System – 
HS – classification) and importing countries. We derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for so-
called technical regulations in their NTM database. These measures are standard-like measures 
potentially addressing market imperfections, rather than other NTMs (e.g., quantity restrictions, 
price control and monopolistic measures) that impede trade.2 We also compute AVEs for other 
                                                            
1 Several investigations using the standard gravity equation approach find some trade facilitating effects of NTMs 
but without a rationalization based on some demand increasing effect or market imperfection presumably mitigated 
by the NTMs being analyzed (see Li and Beghin, 2012). 
2 Earlier versions of our analysis were based on the full set of NTMs and reached similar qualitative results with 
these less appropriate NTM data. 
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policy distortions (tariffs and domestic production subsidies). 12% of HS 6-digit lines are 
affected by these NTMs and 39% of these (4.7% of the lines) exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs, 
indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of NTMs in those sectors. These AVEs are then used to 
evaluate the restrictiveness of the trade policy defined by countries. TRIs computed with these 
AVEs reflect the frequent trade facilitating effect of NTMs. Accounting for these trade-
facilitating effects significantly reduces previous measures of trade policy restrictiveness for 
most countries obtained while forcing standard-like NTMs to be trade impeding. These trade-
facilitating effects cast doubt on the predominant presumption that technical regulation NTMs 
are exclusively protectionist and cannot possibly boost trade, let alone welfare.  
 Our paper proceeds as follows. We present the framework in Section 2. We then describe 
the data and detail the econometric approach in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results of AVEs and TRIs. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. The TRI framework with market imperfection 
We follow the standard TRI approach with the balance of trade function derived from the dual 
approach to trade for a small open distorted economy. We build on the usual framework with a 
negative externality affecting the representative consumer as in Copeland (1994). The externality 
is assumed exogenous to the consumer but influenced by the policymaker via some NTM 
regulations such as standard-like regulations. These regulations may not be set optimally and 
may be set at a protectionist level as in Fisher and Serra (2000). 
 
2.1. Market demand and supply, and balance of trade function 
The utility of the representative consumer is u(x, H(NTM)) with non-negative market 
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goods x and negative externality H influenced by a vector of standard-like NTM policies, NTM, 
and with the usual definitions and properties:3 
.0/ with )(
;0/ and 0/


NTMHNTMHH
Huuxuu Hx
 
All domestic consumer prices p are inclusive of the exogenous world price wp, a tariff τ, 
and the unit cost equivalent of the domestic NTM on foreign suppliers to sell in the domestic 
market, or p = wp + τ + t(NTM).4 
Given domestic prices p, the associated expenditure function is: 
 );|'(),,( HHuuxpMinHupe
x
 ,  
with the usual derivative properties: 
.0/ and ,0))(,,(/  HeeNTMHupxpee Hp   
Expenditure function e exhibits all the usual homogeneity and curvature properties in 
prices, implying p’epp=0, eH=p’epH, eu=p’epu ; epNTM = epH HNTM , and f’eppf ≤ 0 for any arbitrary 
vector f of similar dimension as p. The marginal damage eH of the negative externality is positive 
for any given utility level. To keep utility constant, expenditure has to increase when the 
negative externality increases. Partial derivative eu is the inverse of the marginal utility of 
income assumed positive. We eventually simplify preferences to follow Feenstra (1995) in the 
empirical investigation section.  
The impact of the NTM policy encompasses several possible cases. The demand 
                                                            
3 We could complicate the model by assuming that imports m influence the health externality or H(m(NTM), NTM). 
This would make health depends on all the arguments influencing imports and generate clutter with multiple 
feedback effects of all policies through health. The effect of NTM alone on health generates the possibility of trade 
enhancements which is what we are after. The direction of potential bias from ignoring these feedback effects is 
unclear to us. 
4 Domestic and foreign firms have heterogeneous cost of meeting the NTM standard as explained later in the 
production component of the model and we assume that domestic firms are more efficient at meeting these NTMs. 
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enhancing case is epNTM = epH HNTM < 0. Protectionism of the NTM is implied by HNTM = 0 
because the policy does not address an externality or is not based on science. Another special 
case could be that the NTM policy affects H (Hntm<0) but that H(NTM) does not affect a 
particular demand (particular good n) directly, or epnH = 0. In this case, the policy is not 
protectionist per se but addressing the market imperfection has no bearing on that particular 
demand for good n. These last two cases show the difficulty to gauge revealed protectionism.5  
For integrability of the Hicksian demands into the expenditure function, at least one of 
the demands represented by x has to be influenced by the external effect H. To illustrate, H could 
be the negative health effect of consuming products that are hazardous if minimum quality 
standards are not imposed on their production. The standard reduces the occurrence of sickness 
which may affect the demand for these products, and possibly other demands via better health 
(reduced medical expenditure, more active leisure activities) or none other at all (all other 
demands independent of health status). Similar examples can be constructed with environmental 
external effects such as global commons or consumer packaging waste in retail consumption. 
On the production side, domestic supply decisions in competitive industries are derived 
from the gdp function: 
( max(, ) ' ( , ) 0) ,p p
y
gdp p p y y zz g   
with y denoting the net output vector, z the vector of fixed national endowments, and pp the 
vector of producer prices. Producer prices include production subsidies, s, such as farm 
subsidies, not seen by consumers, ( )pp wp t NTM s    . World prices can be normalized to 1 
so the distortions s, t, and τ are viewed indifferently as either ad valorem or specific policy 
                                                            
5 Demand not being enhanced by the NTM policy is not sufficient although suspicion of protectionism may arise. 
I -
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distortions. For simplicity we assume that domestic firms already meet the standards implied by 
NTM but that foreign firms may not. A more complicate framework affecting both domestic and 
foreign firms could be included but the essence here is that t(NTM) captures the asymmetric 
protective effect of NTM at the border on foreign industries.6 The gdp function has the usual 
envelope and homogeneity properties:  
pgdp = 0;  and ' 0 for a/ ;  ' ; ny/ ' .'
p p p p p
p p ppp f ggdp p y p gdp gdp p y p p g p dp fd f        
For convenience we also define compensated excess demand functions m, with 
( , , ( ), , ) ( , , ( ) ( , )p pm p p H NTM u z x p u H NTM y p z  , with partial derivatives indicated by the 
appropriate subscript as for functions e and gdp.  
Now we have all the elements to develop the balance of trade function B: 
( , )  
( ) '( ( , , ) )) ' ).
p
p p p
B p, p wp, NTM,z,H, u
e(p, u, H NTM )- gdp(p , z) - τ x p u H  - y(p ,  z s y(p ,  z

       (1) 
Variable B indicates the amount of foreign exchange necessary to sustain utility u given NTM, 
wp, z, s, and τ. Homogeneity in prices and envelope properties of e and gdp lead to a simpler 
formulation of (1) seemingly omitting tariff revenues and production subsidy costs.  
( , , , , ( ), ) (1 ( )) '( ( , , ( )) - ( , ).p pB p p wp  z H NTM  u t NTM x p  u  H NTM y p  z             (1’) 
 
2.2. Trade restrictiveness indices with externality 
The TRI problem in our case is to find a scalar T equivalent (holding utility constant) to 
standard-like policies, tariffs, and production subsidies to apply as a tariff surcharge on world 
prices such that:                                                              
6 NTM would then enter the GDP function and the derivative pNTM NTMgdp y  would represent the leftward shift 
of domestic supplies caused by the NTM policies. The unit cost equivalent of y
NTM
 would be assumed to be smaller 
than t(NTM) to indicate a net protective effect of NTM on domestic suppliers as in Fisher and Serra (2000).  
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0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( (1 ), (1 ), , , (0), )
( ( ), ( ) , , , ( ), ) .
B wp T wp T wp z H u
B wp t NTM wp t NTM s wp z H NTM u B 
  
            (2) 
The tariff surcharge accounts for several components: tariffs τ, domestic production 
subsidies s, the demand shift via H(NTM), and the protective effect from raising foreign cost to 
satisfy technical measure NTM, that is, t(NTM).  
Next, as in Anderson et al. (1995), while holding u constant, we differentiate equation (2) 
with respect to T, τ, s, and NTM to derive the relative change in T rather than T as it is 
customarily done in the TRI literature. This step yields: 
' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( /  ) ,p p pp p H NTMp p pB wp B wp dT B B d t NTM dNTM B ds B H dNTM            (3) 
with subscripts denoting the variable involved in the partial derivative of B. Solving for dT 
yields:  
' ' ' ' ' ' '(1/ ( ))[( ) (( ) /  + ) ],p p p pp p p H NTMp p p pdT B wp B wp B B d B ds B B t NTM B H dNTM          (4) 
with partial derivatives Bi: 
' '
' '
'
;
( ) ;
( ( )) 0. 
p
p pp
ppp
H pH
B e
B s gdp
B wp t NTM e


 
 
  
 
Equation (4) shows that the TRI has three policy components corresponding to the tariff, 
subsidy, and NTM policies. The NTM component is the sum of a demand effect via reduced 
externality H, and a NTM protectionist effect relative to foreign goods (through a tariff 
equivalent t increasing in NTM). While the sign of this protectionist effect on imports is clear, the 
combined effect of NTM on m via the externality H and the protectionist effect t(NTM) is 
ambiguous as their relative magnitude is unknown analytically. For example, a pure protectionist 
NTM policy imposing useless labeling requirements would raise t(NTM) and have no effect on 
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consumers’ perception and would lead to a welfare loss and trade contraction. Conversely, 
standards requiring safe goods including imported ones are likely to lead to a net demand-
enhancing effect lowering transaction costs for consumers. The latter NTM policy would be 
trade and welfare enhancing. The econometric investigation will sort the NTM regimes into trade 
reducing and trade facilitating since we do not impose any “protectionist” NTM prior. 
Next, to further elucidate these effects and undertake our empirical investigation, we 
assume a simplified structure for the Hessian matrix of cross-price responses (epp - gdppp) as in 
Feenstra (1995), and others. The Hessians epp and gdppp are each assumed to be diagonal and 
constant, which leads to ' '0 and 0 if   and  are non negativepppB B s  .7 From these conditions 
we derive an implementable framework to approximate the sector total AVE corresponding to all 
policy types τ, s and NTM as well as the implied TRI and the MTRI. In general, if the Hessian 
matrices of price responses of imports (or demand and supply responses) are not constrained to 
be diagonal, off-diagonal elements can be positive or negative and it is impossible to a priori 
sign elements of  and pp pB B and therefore the change in the TRI, dT. The computation of T is 
obviously cumbersome in the presence of cross-price effects and non-constant slopes. 
We recover TRI T from dT as in Feenstra (1995) and Kee et al. (2009), which is 
equivalent to the initial tariffs, subsidies, and NTMs relative to a world with all policies set to 0 
by integrating both sides of (4) with respect to T going from zero to T and policies going from 
(0,0,0) to (τ, s, NTM). The latter approach works only if dT is non-negative. This step yields: 
(1/ '( )) ( ) ,p ppp pp p p NTMpT wp gdp e wp B B B B TMs N                     (5) 
                                                            
7 This simplification reduces price effects to the own-price effect, and homogeneity holds implicitly by defining 
prices relative to a numéraire good.   
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with ' '( ) /  +pNTM p H NTMpB B B t NTM B H    whose sign is undetermined. The original formula in 
Feenstra (1995) contains the first positive element from tariffs abstracting from s and NTM. 
Here, two additional components originate from production subsidies (positive contribution to 
the TRI), as long as subsidies are positive, and from NTM policies (ambiguous sign). The 
formula in Kee et al. (2009) has the protectionist effects of tariffs and subsidies and a 
protectionist effect of NTMs. No externality or demand enhancement appears in their equation. 
This additional effect included in our equation (5) can potentially facilitate trade and complicates 
the simple narrative of obstructive NTM policies and their tax equivalent. Equation (5) is in 
essence the square root of a weighted sum of deadweight losses from tariff, production subsidies, 
and the welfare effects of NTMs. If the latter is a pure protectionist policy, then BHHNTM is zero 
(no demand shift) and the dead weight loss from the tariff equivalent t(NTM) is added to the sum 
of deadweight losses. If the NTM policy facilitates trade, then the latter maps into a welfare gain. 
Removing the NTM decreases the TRI as welfare falls with its removal. If the latter effect 
dominates the distortionary effect of tariffs and subsidies, then dT is negative and T cannot be 
recovered using (5). Instead, dT is the form of choice as in the early TRI investigations (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 1995). 
These effects are illustrated in partial equilibrium in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the two 
effects of the NTM policies, that is, the demand enhancement shift (from x to x’ with greater 
utility achieved with reduced health hazard), and the increase in border price (wp+t(NTM)+τ) 
reflecting the international cost of meeting the country’s standard and the tariff, and their total 
effects on imports m. In previous investigations only the border price effect of NTM, t(NTM), 
was considered and the trade (and welfare) impact of NTM on imports was detrimental by 
assumption. 
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Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Along with the TRI, we consider the MTRI, which holds aggregate imports (wp’m) 
constant. The MTRI yields the tariff equivalent to all distortions holding aggregate trade 
unchanged but allowing for welfare variation. The MTRI is derived in Anderson and Neary 
(2003) and Kee et al. (2009) who call it the overall TRI (OTRI). The derivation of the MTRI 
follows the spirit of the derivation of the TRI and we only present its final formula in equation 
(12). We refer readers to Anderson and Neary (2003) for details. 
An important consequence from the potential presence of trade-enhancement effects and 
negative AVEs from NTMs is that our TRI and MTRI estimates will be equal or smaller than the 
TRI and MTRI where all policies are constrained to be trade reducing. We discuss this important 
point in the empirical section. 
 
2.3. The import equation to estimate 
Next, we derive the import equation to estimate and the AVEs of all policy instruments. Totally 
differentiation of m (holding u constant) for changes in exogenous variables leads to a change in 
imports of good n in any country equal to: 
( / ) ( / ) [( / )( / )
( / )( / )] ( / ) .
n n n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n
dm m dp d y p ds m dp t NTM
x H H NTM dNTM y z dz
        
                  (6) 
Equation (6) and m provide a way to estimate the response of imports to tariffs, subsidies, 
and NTM policies, and other variables as in Feenstra (1995). We then derive the estimate of the 
AVE to the net effect of NTM policies on good n. Unfortunately we cannot separately identify 
the individual effects of NTM on m in (6), but we can estimate their net effect. Following a 
13 
 
common practice we move the tariff effect on the left hand side of (6) and the general 
specification for the import demand of good n in country c (as indicated by superscript n,c) is: 
, , , , ,
, , ,ln ln(1 ) .
n c n c z n c S n c NTM n c
n c n k k n c n c
k
m z s NTM                     (7) 
Elasticity n,c is the own-price response of import of good n in country c. ,NTMn c  is the sum of two 
AVE components (the tariff equivalent of NTM on world prices, and the ambiguous import 
subsidy/tax effect of NTM via decreased externality). Note that the latter AVE component is 
bound to the left to -100% as prices are non-negative. This non-negative constraint provides a 
lower bound of -100% on cn
NTM
,  if we further assume that there is no trade impediment effect of 
the NTM policy (t(NTM)=0) at the border. This is a limit case to establish the lowest non-
negative prices faced by agents in the economy.  
Equation (7) once estimated provides the basis for the total AVE of NTM policies on 
good n, NTMtotalAVE , which is:  
, ,/ , with 1 .total
NTM NTM NTM
n c n c totalAVE AVE                 (8) 
An AVE is developed similarly for production subsidies, based on the fact that 
cncn
S
cn
SAVE ,,, /)1(   , with ( / /= x p m p     ). Unfortunately, parameter γ is not readily known as 
we only have estimates of import demand price elasticities and not the underlying output and 
demand price responses. Hence, we estimate a lower bound to the production subsidy AVE by 
abstracting from fraction (1-γ). Alternatively, the production subsidy AVE estimate could be 
seen as a market price support subsidy, affecting both consumer and producer prices. This 
assumption is common although not fully accurate. 
Next, we specify ,
NTM
n c as a transformation of an exponential such that it satisfies a lower 
I 
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bound on the total AVE of the NTM effects as before and in addition allowing for fixed effects 
per commodity and interaction terms with country-specific exogenous shifters (endowments) z. 
For a continuous NTM variable, this leads to ,, ( )exp
NTM NTM NTM n c
n c n nk k
k
a z     , with parameter 
a constrained such that the AVE of NTM is lower bounded at -1 or -100%. The corresponding 
value is a=εn,c. If NTM is approximated by a dichotomous variable, then the various partial 
derivatives of m, and t with respect to NTM do not exist and are replaced by the first difference 
of m for NTM equal to one and zero. This leads to an alternative formula of the total NTM AVE 
( dumNTM
total
AVE ) following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980): 
, ,[exp( ) 1] / ,  with 1 .dum dum
NTM NTMNTM
total n c n c totalAVE AVE              (9) 
The lower bound condition in (9) is slightly more cumbersome with a dichotomous NTM. 
The intuition is that ,exp( ) 1
NTM
n c   cannot be too large of a positive number to keep producer and 
consumer prices non-negative (or that , ,exp( ) 1
NTM
n c n c    or , ,ln(1 )NTMn c n c   ). Using the 
same specification as for the continuous variable case of ,
NTM
n c , we specify the lower bound 
constraint for the dichotomous case using parameter a in ,, ( )exp
NTM NTM NTM n c
n c n nk k
k
a z     with 
,ln(1 )n ca   . For small values of ,n c , the dichotomous and continuous values of a are 
approximately equal. 
A parallel formulation is used for 
k
cn
knk
S
n
S
cn
S z )exp( ,,  . As production subsidy s 
is positive, presumably its AVE would not lead to negative producer price issues.  
The total AVE of all distortions, that is, tariffs, NTMs, and subsidies for good n in 
country c is then (assuming the normalization wp=1): 
II II II II 
II II II II 
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.,,,, cn
s
cn
NTM
cncn AVEAVETOT                         (10) 
The TRI in equation (5) translates into:  
1/22
,( / )
( / )
nc nc n c
n
c
nc nc
n
m p TOT
T
m p
        

 .                        (11) 
Again, if (4) gives a negative dT, then (11) cannot be used and the change in TRI, dT, is 
kept to express the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy 
interventions. Recall that dT is expressed as a sum of consumer welfare changes, and that T is the 
square root of a positive sum of deadweight losses.  
As noted above, we use the same data and AVE estimates to compute the MTRI, merccT : 
,( / )
( / )
nc nc n c
merc n
c
nc nc
n
m p TOT
T
m p
        

 .                        (12) 
 
 
 
 
3. Data and econometric specification 
We use the UNCTAD8-Comtrade database of Kee et al. (2009)9 as well as their import demand 
estimates (Kee et al., 2008) to estimate the import demand equation (7), recover AVEs 
(equations (9) and (10)) at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), and compute the 
                                                            
8 United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. 
9 As recently pointed by Breaux et al. (2013), the new NTM data collection effort under the interagency MAST 
project seems to be problematic and less promising than one could have hoped. The older TRAINS database appears 
more reliable than the new MAST dataset.  
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MTRI and TRI, (and dTRI) equivalents to the three types of distortions (tariffs, NTMs and 
subsidies) as in equations (11) and (12) (or (4) for negative dTRI) for each country. 
 
3.1. Data 
Trade data come from the Comtrade database. We use the average of imports at the HS 6-digit 
line by importing country between 2001 and 2003. Imports demand elasticities are extracted 
from Kee et al. (2008). Tariff data are taken out from the UNCTAD and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Tariffs are for the most recent year for which data are available between 
2000 and 2004. For specific tariffs, ad valorem equivalents are used. Data on NTMs are from the 
UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database and the following NTMs 
are selected: technical regulations. As mentioned previously, we abstract from other NTMs (e.g., 
quantity restrictions, price control and monopolistic measures) included in the database as they 
are heterogeneous and different from standard-like policies in their potential effects on demand. 
A dummy is set to one if the importing country imposes at least one technical regulation on a 
given HS6 product. Regarding production subsidies, the global dataset of Kee et al. (2009) 
covers agricultural domestic support. The source is the WTO domestic agricultural support 
notifications. This continuous variable is in dollars and its log form is used in the estimations.  
Countries’ characteristics are measured by the economic size (gross domestic product – 
GDP), and relative factor endowments (agricultural land over GDP, capital over GDP, and labor 
over GDP). Data are extracted from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Two 
geographical variables are also introduced: a dummy for islands and a measure of remoteness 
(average distance to world markets defined as the import-weighted distance to each trading 
partner). Our sample includes 93 importing countries and 4,934 products (HS6 lines).  
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3.2. Econometric specification  
We run estimations HS 6-digit line by HS 6-digit line. To control for the potential endogeneity of 
NTMs and production subsidies, we instrument them using exports, GDP-weighted average of 
the NTM dummy variable at the HS 6-digit of the 5 closest neighbors (in terms of geographic 
distance) and the GDP-weighted average of the agricultural domestic support at the HS 6-digit of 
the 5 closest neighboring economies (Kee et al., 2009). The instrumented estimation is 
performed in two stages. We first estimate a probit where the dependent variable is the presence 
or the absence of a technical regulation NTM and the explanatory variables are the instruments. 
The mills ratio derived from this first stage is then included in the second stage equation. If one 
(or more) country provides production subsidies, instruments for this variable (exports, GDP-
weighted average of the agricultural domestic support of the 5 closest neighbors) are also 
included in the second stage equation. 
The quantity impact of the standard-like NTMs and production subsidies is then 
transformed into price-equivalents (AVEs) using the provided import demand elasticities. AVEs 
are calculated for each importing country and HS6 line. We impose a positive cap AVEs at 50 
for a few extreme values (0.01% of the observations). To ease result interpretation, we compute 
the mean over all importing countries at the HS6 and HS2 levels. Following our estimation, 4.7% 
of AVEs for NTMs at the HS 6-digit level are negative, i.e., highlighting trade-facilitating 
NTMs. Without constraint on the sign of the AVEs, our procedure allows us to keep these 
negative values in our sample. AVEs of NTMs, tariffs and production subsidies are then 
aggregated at the country level to derive the trade restrictiveness indices corresponding to all 
three types of policy interventions. 
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Finally, we use bootstrapping to compute the standard deviations of the AVEs. The main 
advantage of this procedure is to account for sampling and estimation errors of the AVEs. We 
draw (with repetition) 200 random samples from our dataset and perform the AVEs estimation 
for each of these samples. Estimations are run HS6 line by HS6 line. We then compute the 
bootstrap standard errors as the standard deviations of these 200 AVEs. 
 
4. Results 
We first present the results on AVEs of NTMs in the presence of externalities. We also provide 
comparisons with the AVEs obtained when the latter are constrained to be trade reducing.  
 
4.1. AVEs of NTMs 
We focus the discussion on the results obtained for the first 20 HS sections.10 Qualitative 
conclusions are unchanged if the discussion of results is performed at the HS 2-digit level (with 
96 sectors, see Table A.1 of the Online Appendix attached for review). Table 1 first reports the 
simple frequency ratio of NTMs for each HS section, i.e., the share of HS6 lines within each HS 
section for which at least one importing country of our sample imposes at least one technical 
regulation NTM. The frequency ratio of NTMs should be interpreted as follows: for section I 
“live animals, animal products”, the value 0.209 means that 20.9% of HS6 lines included in HS 
section I are affected by at least one technical regulation NTM in at least one importing country.  
Results suggest that agricultural and food products (sections I through IV) are more 
affected by NTMs than manufactured products. The frequency ratio is indeed larger for these 
products. These industries have high numbers of countries’ notifications of sanitary and 
                                                            
 10 Section XXI (objects of art and antiques) has very few HS6 lines with NTMs and is not reported. 
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phytosanitary measures to the WTO. 
The next column of Table 1 reports the average AVE of these NTMs for each HS section 
allowing for the presence of externalities. The mean is computed over all importing countries 
and HS6 lines within each section. The mean AVE on the whole sample is equal to 0.044, but 
strong differences can be observed across sections. First, the magnitude of the mean AVE varies 
significantly across sections from 0.002 to 0.083. All sections exhibit a non negative average 
AVE, indicating that technical regulation NTMs have, on average, a net negative impact on trade 
flows. For two sections (Pearls and precious metals and stones, and Arms and ammunition11), the 
average AVE is near zero, suggesting that NTMs have on average no net impact. In our sample, 
12.1% of HS6 lines are affected by NTMs and 38.8% of them exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs. 
These negative AVEs are spread over all HS sections (and HS2 sectors as shown in Online 
Appendix Table A.1). Column (3) of Table 1 underlines the upward bias affecting the estimation 
of AVEs when NTM are constrained to be trade-reducing. As expected, the average AVE for 
each HS section is systematically higher than the average AVE obtained in column (2). Using 
averages, the bias is about 100% (from 0.088 to 0.044). 
As highlighted with the frequency ratio, the share of HS6 lines subject to at least one 
NTM greatly differs across sections and could therefore bias the average AVE calculated using 
all HS6 lines. To control for this bias, columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 report the average AVE 
computed only on HS6 lines on which at least one technical measure NTM is applied. Column 
(4) allows for the presence of market imperfections and trade-facilitating NTMs, while column 
(5) does not. As expected, the average AVE computed only on HS6 lines subject to a technical 
regulation NTM is always higher in absolute value than the one based on all HS6 lines (with or 
                                                            
11 The sector of arms and ammunition is least likely to observed commercial trade and standard-like NTM policies. 
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without a NTM). Table 1 also shows that forcing technical regulation NTMs to be trade 
impeding leads to an even larger bias when looking at sectors for which at least one technical 
regulation NTM is present. This bias is particular strong for agricultural and food sectors 
(sections 1 through 4). For example, for section 4 (Prepared foodstuff), the constrained AVE 
estimates are on average twelve-fold larger (0.608 and 0.049).   
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Table 2 distinguishes between trade-reducing and trade facilitating NTM estimates using 
results from the unconstrained estimation (allowing for external effects). Again results are 
summarized by HS section. The first column of Table 2 provides the share of technical 
regulation NTM-ridden observations with positive AVEs (trade-reducing NTMs). This share 
varies across sections, from 43.9% (Prepared foodstuffs) to 100% (Pearls, precious metals…). 
For 18 out of 20 sections, the majority of NTMs are trade-reducing (with a share above 50%). In 
total, 61.2% of NTM-ridden lines at the HS6 level are negatively affected by technical regulation 
NTMs.  
The last 2 columns of Table 2 show the mean AVE for trade-reducing technical 
regulation NTMs and that of trade-facilitating technical regulation NTMs by HS section. We 
previously noticed that these NTMs were more numerous on agricultural products. According to 
the second column of Table 2, the AVEs of trade-reducing NTMs on agricultural and food 
products are slightly higher than the ones obtained on most manufactured products. The average 
positive AVE for the whole sample is equal to 1.133. In the last column of Table 2, AVEs of 
trade-facilitating NTMs are nonpositive of course, and because of the non-negative price 
constraint, they are included in the interval [-1;0]. Interestingly, we observe that the magnitude 
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of these AVEs is high in absolute value. The minimum in absolute value per section is equal to -
0.801 (section 19 Arms, ammunition) and the maximum (-0.912) is reached for section 18 
(Optical, photographic, medical instruments). The mean over all sections is -0.856. Conclusions 
remain valid at the HS 2-digit level (see Table A.2 of the Online Appendix).  
Insert Table 2 here 
 
Figures 2 and 3 provide further insights on the technical regulation NTM AVES. Figure 2 
shows the scattered plot of AVEs at HS6 level, average over all countries and sorted by HS2 line 
(x-axis numbered from 1 to 96 for 96 HS2 lines). Results at the HS 2-digit level are consistent 
with previous conclusions and some heterogeneity is also observable across HS2 sectors in the 
magnitude of the AVEs of trade reducing and facilitating NTMs. The plot shows the density of 
negative (and positive12) AVEs for most HS2 lines, and in particular for Fish and crustaceans 
(line 3), Inorganic and Organic chemicals (lines 28 and 29), and Iron and steel and Articles of 
iron and steel (lines 72 and 73), Nuclear reactors, Electrical machinery and equipment (lines 84 
and 85), and Optical, photographic, measuring, precision and medical instruments (line 90). The 
plot also shows the presence of large positive outliers for many HS6 lines. Figure 3 shows the 
mean of the HS6 AVE averages by HS2 line when allowing for trade facilitating effects or not. 
All of the within-HS2 means are higher when constraining the estimation to exclude trade-
facilitation effects. Some unconstrained means are negative in Lac, gums and resins (line 13), 
Preparations of meat and fish (line 16), Cocoa (line 18), Pharmaceutical products (line 30) and 
Fertilizers (line 31), suggesting again the presence of a number of trade-facilitating standard-like 
NTM regimes in sector like agri-food sectors and chemicals. To offset that, positive average 
                                                            
 12 The plot is truncated from above at AVE=1 for better clarity and excludes less than 0.18% of the AVE 
estimates. 
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AVEs also abound suggesting trade-reducing effects in various sectors most visibly in 
Preparations of cereals (line 19). For some HS 2-digit sectors, such as Live animals, Dairy 
products, Live trees, and Edible fruit and nuts, more than one quarter of the HS6 lines are subject 
to at least one technical regulation NTM in one importing country. By contrast, for a number of 
manufactured products, the share of HS6 lines impacted by a technical regulation NTM is lower 
to much lower. A strong exception is Pharmaceutical products (HS30) (frequency ratio of 
37.9%). Interestingly, sectors included in Textiles and apparel (section XI) and Footwear and 
headgear (section XII) for which the competition between Northern and Southern countries has 
been historically contentious, are not subject to many standard-like NTMs.  
To sum up, our results suggest the presence of both trade reducing and facilitating 
technical regulation NTMs, with substantial trade effects. Next, these AVEs of technical 
regulation NTMs are further used to calculate the TRI and MTRI. 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here 
 
4.2. Trade restrictiveness indices  
Table 3 reports summary figures of the results for country-level MTRIs, TRIs and changes in 
TRIs. Three calculations are performed based on (i) tariffs only, (ii) overall protection using 
AVEs from the constrained estimation, and (iii) overall protection using unconstrained AVEs. 
The latter two sets of measures are also summarized for all AVE estimates and for the subset of 
significant AVE estimates based on the bootstrap standard errors. The summary statistics are 
presented for all 93 countries, OECD countries, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and then 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. 
The tariff only MTRI and TRI (1st and 6th columns in Table 3) represent the uniform 
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tariff that would provide the same level of imports (MTRI) and welfare (TRI) as the initial tariff 
structure. OECD countries where in most cases except Japan and South Korea tariffs have been 
significantly reduced, exhibit smaller tariff-MTRIs than the 93-country averages, LDCs’ and 
especially the BRICs’ averages. According to detailed country results reported in Table A.3 of 
the Online Appendix, India has the highest tariff-MTRI (0.257) among the 93 countries; Brunei 
and South Korea have the highest tariff-TRI at or above 0.5. Hong-Kong and Singapore have 
zero tariff indices as they do not impose border tariffs.  
Columns (2) and (7) show the MTRI and TRI estimates including all distortions based on 
the AVEs from the estimation constraining NTMs to be trade reducing. As expected, MTRIs and 
TRIs exhibit larger values in columns (2) and (7) than those obtained using AVEs from the 
unconstrained estimation (see columns (4) and (9)). For example for the 93-country summary, 
the median and mean values of the MTRIs are respectively 0.117 and 0.158 with constrained 
estimates and only 0.048 and 0.057 with unconstrained estimates. Similarly, for the TRI the 
median and mean values are 0.293 and 0.325 (constrained estimation) versus 0.218 and 0.256 
(unconstrained estimation). In other words, for all countries included in our sample, the MTRIs 
based on overall protection (tariffs, production subsidies, and NTMs) and allowing for negative 
AVEs are equal or smaller than the MTRIs based on overall protection computed with the 
constrained AVEs. This last result suggests that some technical regulation NTM regimes have 
trade facilitating effects for most countries. Finally, regardless of the estimation method, when 
comparing results using all AVE estimates or only the significant ones based on the bootstrap 
standard errors, one notes with the latter that ranges are reduced for most indices and country 
groupings. 
Countries’ groupings also highlight interesting patterns. The OECD group exhibits 
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negative MTRI values with a small mean (0.036). The LDC group shows all positive MTRIs. We 
also note that iintuitively, many countries with low tariff-MTRIs exhibit negative total MTRIs 
because small tariffs do not counterbalance negative NTM AVEs. Lastly, using more 
disaggregated results by country (see Table A.3 of the Online Appendix), we note that only 28 
over 93 countries have MTRI values for overall protection and based on unconstrained estimates 
are higher than the values based on tariffs only. In addition, as suggested by Figure 4, MTRI for 
tariffs only and MTRIs for all distortions show a strong downward pattern when income per 
capita increases. From Figure 4 it is clear that MRTIs inclusive of all distortions tend to be lower 
than the MTRI for tariffs only, strongly suggesting that standard like NTMs facilitate can trade.  
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
The analysis of the TRIs shows 24 countries with total TRIs based on unconstrained 
estimates smaller than the tariff-only TRI. These results show that positing protectionism of 
technical measure NTMs strongly biases the evaluation of the restrictiveness of these NTM trade 
policies. As previously mentioned, if equation (4) provides a negative dT (cf. supra), then the 
TRI level T cannot be computed using (5). The last columns of Tables 3 report the change in 
TRI, dT, i.e., the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy interventions. 
Country-level results indicate that for 17 over 93 countries, the change in TRI is negative (Table 
A.3 of the Online Appendix). Furthermore, for 25 over 93 countries, change in TRI values are 
smaller than the ones obtained when tariffs only are included in the computation (column (7) of 
Table A.3). These two last results highlight that some technical regulation NTMs can have 
positive welfare effects. Not surprisingly, many OECD countries exhibit negative dTRIs. This 
result is consistent with Disdier et al. (2008)’s results showing intra-OECD agri-food trade being 
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enhanced by NTM regimes. Several LDC countries also exhibit negative dTRIs and these can be 
rationalized by opportunities created with the agri-food trade integration and policy reforms. We 
have in mind the integration of LDCs in European trade following a sequence of structural 
adjustment policies that removed many protectionist NTMs, expanded preferential trade 
agreements and attempted to upgrade quality of goods. The latter induced upgrades of SPS 
regulations and improved food safety in countries like Côte d’Ivoire among others (FAO, 2003; 
Colen et al., 2012; and Maertens et al., 2012). 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
5. Conclusion 
We extend the TRI approach to a small distorted open economy to account for market 
imperfections (externalities, asymmetric information) and NTM domestic regulations addressing 
them. Up to date, the presence of externalities and potential anti-protectionist effects of standard-
like NTMs has been ignored in TRI application. Allowing for such occurrence, we derive the 
AVEs of NTMs, as well as the TRIs and MTRIs equivalent to all policy interventions (tariffs, 
NTMs and production subsidies). We show that in general the impact of NTMs on import 
demand is ambiguous depending on the relative strength of the import-facilitating effects of 
NTMs via a shift in import demand, and the protective effect of the same NTMs at the border. 
We then apply the approach to the UNCTAD-Comtrade database built by Kee et al. (2009). In 
our sample, 12% of HS6 lines are affected by technical regulation NTMs and about 39% of these 
(4.7% of all HS6 lines) show negative AVEs of technical regulation NTMs. The MTRI and TRI 
results show the sizeable changes in estimated aggregate trade and welfare effects of existing 
trade policies. Policy recommendations on the impacts of NTMs will be biased by overstating 
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their trade reducing and welfare decreasing effects. 
Although we show it is possible to rationalize and econometrically identify trade- 
facilitating effects of NTMs mitigating external effects and other market imperfections or having 
anti-protectionist effects on domestic suppliers, we do so using relatively simple NTM proxies 
and aggregate trade flows rather than bilateral ones. It would be interesting to refine these results 
and use more detailed NTM measures and bilateral trade data, and focus on a subset of sectors 
for which we identify negative NTM AVEs. Nevertheless our results corroborate the trade-
facilitating effects found in the literature for some products and countries (e.g. Disdier et al., 
2008; Moenius, 2004). The value added of our analysis is to formalize the possibility of anti-
protectionist effects or external effects and their mitigation through regulations affecting quality 
of products and identify their effects on trade restrictiveness. Our analysis also extends the 
applicability of the TRI framework to more plausible market conditions and lets the data reveal 
unconstrained patterns. 
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Table 1: Frequency ratios and AVEs of technical-regulation NTMs, by HS section 
HS 
section 
codes 
HS section names 
Simple  
frequency 
ratio  
of NTMs 
AVE of NTMs 
all HS6 lines (mean) 
AVE of NTMs 
if NTM=1 (mean) 
   Unconstrained estimationa 
Constrained 
estimationb 
Unconstrained 
estimationa 
Constrained 
estimationb 
I Live animals, animal products 0.209 0.018 0.128 0.084 0.609 
II Vegetable products 0.223 0.028 0.128 0.126 0.574 
III Fats and oils 0.202 0.067 0.145 0.333 0.717 
IV Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, tobacco 0.259 0.013 0.157 0.049 0.608 
V Minerals 0.054 0.027 0.046 0.500 0.846 
VI Chemicals, allied industries 0.134 0.033 0.088 0.244 0.657 
VII Plastics, rubber 0.121 0.052 0.094 0.432 0.774 
VIII Hides, leather, furskins 0.074 0.029 0.056 0.395 0.763 
IX Wood and wood articles 0.105 0.051 0.077 0.486 0.732 
X Pulp of wood, paper, printing 0.096 0.039 0.071 0.404 0.744 
XI Textiles, apparel 0.097 0.033 0.068 0.339 0.695 
XII Footwear, headgear 0.103 0.025 0.064 0.241 0.622 
XIII Stone, cement, ceramic articles, glass 0.081 0.055 0.074 0.681 0.917 
XIV Pearls, precious metals and stones 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.732 0.732 
XV Base metals and articles 0.085 0.044 0.067 0.516 0.796 
XVI Machinery, electrical and video equipment 0.129 0.083 0.114 0.648 0.887 
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels 0.109 0.035 0.080 0.317 0.730 
XVIII Optical, photo., medical instr. 0.096 0.042 0.074 0.441 0.775 
XIX Arms, ammunition 0.044 0.008 0.021 0.182 0.474 
XX Miscellaneous (furniture, toys, others) 0.108 0.062 0.100 0.570 0.925 
 All sections 0.121 0.044 0.088 0.362 0.729 
a: Unconstrained estimation means that impact of technical regulation NTMs on trade is not restricted in the 
econometric estimation. 
b: Constrained estimation means that technical regulation NTMs are constrained to have a non positive impact on 
trade in the estimation. 
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Table 2. AVEs of trade-reducing and trade-facilitating technical regulation NTMs,  
by HS section 
 
HS 
section 
codes 
HS section names 
Share of trade-
reducing 
in NTM- ridden 
observations 
Mean AVE 
trade-reducing 
NTMs 
(AVE>0) 
Mean AVE 
trade-facilitating 
NTMs (AVE0) 
I Live animals, animal products 0.464 1.213 -0.892 
II Vegetable products 0.515 1.070 -0.876 
III Fats and oils 0.554 1.269 -0.829 
IV Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, tobacco 0.439 1.210 -0.860 
V Minerals 0.646 1.259 -0.884 
VI Chemicals, allied industries 0.551 1.130 -0.844 
VII Plastics, rubber 0.644 1.138 -0.846 
VIII Hides, leather, furskins 0.618 1.181 -0.873 
IX Wood and wood articles 0.709 1.025 -0.826 
X Pulp of wood, paper, printing 0.631 1.138 -0.853 
XI Textiles, apparel 0.637 1.031 -0.875 
XII Footwear, headgear 0.594 1.014 -0.889 
XIII Stone, cement, ceramic articles, glass 0.748 1.190 -0.829 
XIV Pearls, precious metals and stones 1.000 0.732 --  
XV Base metals and articles 0.696 1.096 -0.816 
XVI Machinery, electrical and video equipment 0.735 1.175 -0.817 
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels 0.618 1.037 -0.847 
XVIII Optical, photo., medical instr. 0.655 1.155 -0.912 
XIX Arms, ammunition 0.672 0.663 -0.801 
XX Miscellaneous (furniture, toys, others) 0.653 1.341 -0.882 
 All sections 0.612 1.133 -0.856 
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Table 3. Trade restrictiveness indices, summary statistics 
Indices MTRI 
(Tmerc) 
Tmerc Tmccr Tmerc Tmerc TRI 
(T) 
T T T T TRI change
(dT) 
dT dT dT 
Protection tariffs overall protection tariffs overall protection overall protection 
Estimation  constrainedb unconstraineda  constrainedb unconstraineda constrainedb unconstraineda 
Estimates all all signif. all signif. all All signif. all signif. all signif. all signif. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 All 93 countries 
Minimum 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.360 -0.074 0.000 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.002 0.002 -0.266 -0.077 
Maximum 0.257 0.642 0.553 0.279 0.257 0.585 0.894 0.855 0.842 0.595 0.800 0.731 0.708 0.354 
Mean 0.081 0.158 0.140 0.057 0.073 0.142 0.325 0.279 0.256 0.185 0.144 0.114 0.064 0.040 
Median 0.072 0.117 0.112 0.048 0.066 0.121 0.293 0.221 0.218 0.139 0.086 0.049 0.039 0.016 
Std. dev 0.056 0.151 0.131 0.083 0.064 0.098 0.198 0.191 0.157 0.134 0.181 0.153 0.127 0.077 
 OECD countries 
Minimum 0.008 0.009 0.009 -0.106 -0.063 0.042 0.050 0.048 0.050 0.045 0.002 0.002 -0.103 -0.077 
Maximum 0.153 0.387 0.350 0.214 0.133 0.510 0.595 0.566 0.515 0.509 0.354 0.321 0.265 0.259 
Mean 0.041 0.070 0.061 0.036 0.035 0.111 0.270 0.191 0.234 0.127 0.088 0.056 0.054 0.019 
Median 0.028 0.041 0.035 0.030 0.022 0.069 0.272 0.161 0.216 0.093 0.074 0.026 0.039 0.005 
Std. dev 0.036 0.079 0.072 0.050 0.037 0.102 0.125 0.140 0.120 0.101 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.051 
 LDCs 
Minimum 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.007 0.029 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 
Maximum 0.174 0.598 0.508 0.172 0.236 0.220 0.773 0.713 0.520 0.443 0.598 0.508 0.270 0.196 
Mean 0.103 0.193 0.177 0.100 0.108 0.131 0.276 0.262 0.195 0.172 0.126 0.111 0.053 0.038 
Median 0.092 0.136 0.136 0.092 0.094 0.116 0.208 0.205 0.181 0.127 0.043 0.042 0.033 0.016 
Std. dev 0.043 0.180 0.150 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.234 0.216 0.130 0.117 0.202 0.175 0.076 0.057 
 BRICs 
Minimum 0.103 0.233 0.216 0.033 0.071 0.126 0.298 0.298 0.180 0.165 0.089 0.089 0.033 0.027 
Maximum 0.257 0.292 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.298 0.499 0.471 0.298 0.298 0.249 0.222 0.089 0.089 
Mean 0.151 0.261 0.242 0.107 0.142 0.190 0.417 0.399 0.249 0.231 0.179 0.163 0.064 0.057 
Median 0.123 0.260 0.247 0.069 0.120 0.168 0.435 0.413 0.260 0.231 0.190 0.171 0.068 0.056 
Std. dev 0.072 0.024 0.019 0.102 0.081 0.081 0.088 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.069 0.058 0.026 0.031 
a: Unconstrained estimation means that impact of NTMs on trade is not restricted in the econometric estimation. b: Constrained estimation means that NTMs are 
constrained to have a non positive impact on trade in the estimation. OECD: all OECD members included in our sample. BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
LDCs: Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia. 
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Figure 1. The impact of NTMs on demand, supply and imports 
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Figure 2. Scattered plot of HS6 level NTM AVES averaged over countries and shown by HS2 line 
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Figure 3. Mean and median (by HS2) of HS6 NTM AVEs average 
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Figure 4. MTRIs for tariffs and MTRIs for all distorsions against income par capida 
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Figure 4. MTRls for tariffs and MTRls for all distortions against income per capita 
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